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ETHICS IN TRANSITION: UNREPRESENTED
LITIGANTS AND THE CHANGING

JUDICIAL ROLE
RUSSELL ENGLER*

INTRODUCTION

The flood of unrepresented litigants in civil cases over the
past decade has caused a fundamental reexamination of the
operation of many of our courts.' The phenomenon has inspired
conferences,' publications, 3 and websites 4 replete with informa* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, New England
School of Law. I am grateful for the helpful feedback I received from Paula
Galowitz, Neal Kravitz, Tracy Miller, and Richard Zorza. I am also indebted to
Stephen Gillers for his collaboration on a memorandum related to this article.
This work was supported by a stipend from the Board of Trustees of New
England School of Law.
1. See, e.g.,JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND

GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND

COURT MANAGERS

(1998) (providing information on the challenges, legal and ethical issues,
resources for management, and policy recommendations regarding pro se litigation); Russell Engler, And Justicefor All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FoR.DHM L. REv. 1987 (1999)
(examining the roles of various actors of the legal system in working with
unrepresented litigants).
2. Conferences addressing the issue of unrepresented litigants included
the Eastern Regional Conference on Access to Justice for the Self-Represented
Litigant (White Plains, NY, 2006); the New York State Unified Court System
Access to Justice Conference (Albany, NY, 2001); the Massachusetts Statewide
Conference on Unrepresented Litigants (Worcester, MA, 2001); The Changing
Face of Legal Practice: A National Conference on Unbundled Legal Services
(Baltimore, MD, 2000); and the National Conference on Self-Represented Litigants Appearing in Court (Scottsdale, AZ, 1999).
3. Publications include those by the American Judicature Society and
State Justice Institute, such asJONA GOLDSCHMIDT & LISA MILORD, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT ETHICS JUDGES' GUIDE (1996): GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 1;
CYNTHIA GRAY, REACHING OUT OR OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/Pro
%20se%20litigants%20final.pdf; BETH M. HENSCHEN, LESSONS FROM THE COUN.
TRY (2002), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/LessonsjI.pdf; see also
RicHARD ZoRZA, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT (2002), available at http://
www.lri.lsc.gov/pdf/03/03011 lselfhelpct.pdf.
4. For information on the web, see the "Pro Se Resources" page of the
American Judicature Society's website, at http://www.ajs.org/prose/
pro-resources.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2008); the website funded by the State
Justice Institute, serving as a network for practitioners of self-help programs, at
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tion, analysis, and guidance. The discussions occur amidst the
backdrop of reports demonstrating the high incidence of unmet
legal needs among the poor and working poor, as well as a desperate shortage of lawyers available to represent the poor.5
The focus on unrepresented litigants has forced a reexamination of the roles of the players who encounter large numbers
of such litigants each day in the legal system. Unrepresented litigants raise difficult issues for court clerks and court-connected
mediators, for lay advocates and lawyers participating in assistance programs, and for lawyers dealing with unrepresented
adverse parties.6 The court system's response to the problems
includes a reexamination of how these players perform their
roles.7
Nowhere are the issues more challenging than for judges
presiding over their cases involving unrepresented litigants. It is
the judges, ultimately, who are responsible for the fairness of the
proceedings before them and the court orders that emerge from
their courtrooms. Judges preside over trials involving unrepresented litigants-a scenario that receives the most attention in
the literature' but involves a small percentage of the dispositions.
A more common disposition is a settlement negotiated by the
parties, often in an unmonitored hallway setting, that is subsequently given the court's imprimatur.9 Despite the difficulty of
http://www.SelfHelpSupport.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2008); and the website of
the Network of Self-Represented Litigation, at http://www.srln.org (last visited

Mar. 15, 2008).
5. Legal needs studies have consistently shown that anywhere from seventy to ninety percent of legal needs of the poor go unaddressed in America.
See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTINGTHEJUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 12
(2005), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (comparing the level of
legal needs reported by low-income households to the percentage of those
needs for which legal help was received or sought). The Legal Services Report
relies on recent legal needs studies from Montana (2005), Illinois (2005), Tennessee (2004), Connecticut (2003), Massachusetts (2003), Washington (2003),
NewJersey (2002), Vermont (2001), and Oregon (2000). Id. at 9. Virtually "all
of the recent state studies found a level of need substantially higher than the
level" found in a 1994 study conducted by the American Bar Association. Id. at
13.
6. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, passim.
7.

See, e.g., id.; John M. Greacen, Legal Information vs. Legal Advice-Devel-

opments During the Last Five Years, 84JUDICATURE 198 passim (2001), available at
http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro-greacen.asp.
8. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented PoorPersons,85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 107
n.121, 116 n.163 (1997) (citing various sources that provide data on percentages of litigants that proceed pro se at trial).
9. Id. at 80 n.3; see alsoJUDITH S. KAYE &JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT Sys., HOUSING COURT PROGRAM: BREAKING NEw GROUND 8-9
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the questions raised by these scenarios, and the frequency with
which they arise, there has been relatively little scholarly attention to the topic."0
This Article analyzes the shift over the past decade in attitudes concerning the proper role of judges in handling cases
involving unrepresented litigants. It begins with a brief examination of the traditional role ofjudges, as evidenced by the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and the cases addressing the proper judicial
role. The Article next discusses evidence indicating that the
actual practice of some judges has varied far more than the texts
of the decisions might reveal. The evidence also shows that our
understanding of, and attitudes toward, the role of the judge
have changed considerably. Given the fluidity of the judicial role,
and the need for the courts to respond to the crisis they face with
unrepresented litigants, the Article ends with a discussion of why
the active role is both necessary and permissible in certain contexts and the price of the failure to support such a shift.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE-ON PAPER

The guidance in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct comes
from general language applicable to judges in all cases. Judges
are required to "uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety." 1" The concepts are intertwined with the obligation thatjudges act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the "independence, integrity,
and impartiality" of the judiciary." Judges must perform their
duties "impartially, competently, and diligently," 3 requiring
judges to perform their duties fairly, "without bias or
(1997) (on file with author); N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS ASS'N, THE NEW YORK CITY
HOUSING COURT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 11-19 (2005) (on file with author).
10. See, e.g., Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when PartiesAppear Pro Se:
Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 423,
423 (2004).
Notwithstanding the numerical evidence of the importance of this
phenomenon, and the obviousness of its impact on both litigants and
judges, during most of the recent period of rapid growth there has
been little public academic or judicial attention, and indeed little ABA
or state regulatory attention, to how the judiciary should be responding to the challenge of this change in the courtroom.
Id. For a discussion of recent articles on the subject, see infra Part II.
11.
MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
12. Id. at R. 1.2.
13. Id. at Canon 2.
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prejudice,"1 4 while remaining "patient, dignified, and
courteous." 5
The text of the Canons and Commentary provides little
direct guidance as to how active or passive a judge should be in
handling cases involving unrepresented litigants. In the words of
one set of authors trying to provide guidance as to appropriate
judicial techniques: "In sum, the Canons of Judicial Ethics
require judges to remain fair and impartial and to maintain the
appearance of fairness and impartiality, but give no further guidance about the meaning of those terms when unrepresented
persons appear in court. "16
In an effort to provide some guidance when unrepresented
litigants are involved, the ABA House of Delegates added a new
comment to Rule 2.2 in 2007, regarding impartiality and fairness:
"It is not a violation of this Rule, however, for a judge to make
reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard. '17 As explained below,
the language continues a consistent trend of encouraging judges
to make reasonable accommodations to unrepresented litigants
as a matter of fairness." The new language, however, hardly
resolves the difficult questions facing judges daily.
Cases interpreting the judicial role when unrepresented litigants are involved draw from the basic principles in the Canons,
requiring that judges remain impartial and neutral, while being
fair and providing justice. Some cases emphasize that unrepresented litigants must play by the same rules as represented parties and can expect no special treatment.1 9 Some caution that the
judge may not play the role of advocate or attorney for the
unrepresented litigant. 20 Others suggest that judges must provide some measure of assistance to the unrepresented litigant to
of justice, and must do so in construing pro
avoid a miscarriage
21
se pleadings.
An effort to draw lessons from the cases is complicated by
two problems in the analysis. First, although most cases settle, the
Id. at R. 2.3(A).
Id. at R. 2.8(B).
Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving SelfRepresented Litigants, 42 JUDGES' J. 16, 19 (2003).
14.
15.
16.
17.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

R. 2.2 cmt. 4.

18. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
19. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 2013 n.122.
20. See, e.g., id. at 2013 n.123.
21. See, e.g., Albrecht et al., supra note 16, at 20 ("All federal and virtually
all state courts have precedents that papers submitted by persons representing
themselves will be subject to a different standard ofjudicial review than filings
submitted by lawyers."); Engler, supra note 1 at 2013-14 n.124.
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published decisions tend to focus on the judge's role in either
construing pleadings or conducting trials; they provide very little
guidance to daily tasks that occupy the attention of judges in
many civil cases. Second, the cases tend to recycle general language, without regard to the context of the case. As a result, language uttered in the context of a criminal proceeding, for which
there is a constitutional right to appointed counsel, or in cases
involving vexatious plaintiffs, is applied to other fact patterns
without any analysis as to whether it is appropriate to do so. 22
The next section discusses the difficulties these realities cause for
judges trying to discern the proper way to handle their more
common civil cases in light of the language in the Code, the
Commentary, and the cases.
1I. THE
A.

TRANSITION: IN PRACTICE, IN TRAINING, AND IN THEORY

The Challenges in DiscerningGuidancefrom the
General Principles

The ease with which the general principles may be recited
belies the complexities facing judges attempting to apply those
principles to cases involving unrepresented litigants. One court,
speaking in 1979, concluded that "'[the proper scope of the
court's responsibility (to a pro se litigant) is necessarily an
expression of careful exercise of judicial discretion and cannot
be fully described by specific formula."' 23 Almost two decades
later, in response to a court managers' survey, eighty-four percent of the respondents wrote that the court has no written or
unwritten statewide or local court policies/instructions, administrative orders, or rules governing the manner in which pro se
litigants should be handled by the judges in the courtroom;
eighty percent wrote that there were no such instructions in the
litigation process generally.2 4
As the problems related to cases involving unrepresented litigants gained increased attention, the reality that judges
employed a range of techniques emerged from the shadows.
Instrumental in exposing this reality was the 1998 publication by
the American Judicature Society (AJS) and State Justice Institute
(SJI) of Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and
Guidebook forJudges and Managers.The volume included ten pages
of 'judicial attitudes and strategies" informed by responses from
22. For a more detailed analysis of the case law, see Engler, supra note 1,
at 2013-14 n.124; see also Albrecht et al., supra note 16, at 20.
23. Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979) (quoting COMM. ON
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., TRIAL COURTS § 2.23 at 46 (1976)).
24.

GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 124.
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judges to survey questions. 2 ' The responses revealed a wide array
of practices. Not surprisingly, the more judges distrusted unrepresented litigants, or felt the litigants were trying to take advantage of the legal system and pursue hidden agendas, the less
likely the judges felt any obligation to help. 26 The more judges
felt that the absence of counsel was depriving litigants of access
to justice, the more likely the judges were to help.2 7
Even judges inclined to provide some assistance felt constrained by their understanding of impartiality. "Many judges
equate impartiality with passivity."'28 While some judges felt that it
was harder to maintain control over the proceeding where both
parties were unrepresented, others felt those cases were easier
because the parties were on equal footing. 29 Cases involving a
represented party against an unrepresented one presented the
greatest challenge to maintaining impartiality.
As the century drew to a close, a shift in attitudes and techniques became evident from publications, case law, conferences,
and websites. The shift came amidst the backdrop of report after
report documenting unmet legal needs in civil cases and a critical shortage of lawyers for the poor; 30 reality set in that unrepresented litigants were here to stay. Judicial bias against
unrepresented litigants was increasingly attacked, and judges
were urged to accommodate unrepresented litigants and facilitate their efforts to present their cases. For example, the Pro Se
Implementation Committee of Minnesota's Conference of Chief
Judges, in its 1997 "Final Report," issued its proposed protocol,
emphasizing how judicial officers should set up different procedures "during hearings involving pro se litigants." The protocol
includes explanations that should be provided to help pro se litigants understand the procedures.3 " Idaho later promulgated a
proposed protocol modeled after the Minnesota version.3 2
25. Id. at 52-61.
26. See id.
27. See id.; see alsoJona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts HandlingPro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 18-19 (1998) ("In order to ensure a fair hearing for
all parties, I assist pro se litigants with the presentation of their claim or
defense, and 'protect' the pro se litigant who is being taken advantage of by an
attorney.").
28. GOLDSCMIDT ET AL., supra note 1, at 53.
29. Id. at 54.

30.
31.
32.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Albrecht et al., supra note 16, at 18.

COMM. TO INCREASE ACCESS TO THE COURTS, PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO
BE USED BY IDAHO JUDGES DURING HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITI-

GANTS (2002), http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/idaho-protocol.pdf.
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In 1999, the California Commission on judicial Performance
publicly censured a judge for failing to respect the rights of pro
se litigants, concluding that the judge's behavior violated the
Canons related to impartiality and integrity. 33 In 2000, the Colorado Tenth Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance issued a recommendation of "do not retain" for a judge in
part based on a survey noting the judge's "demeaning and harsh
treatment of individuals appearing in her court without legal
counsel."34 A 2001 AJS editorial acknowledged that, although the
efforts to clarify the role of the judge are moving slowly, guidance is emerging; the editorial closed by asserting that "[a] long
with litigants represented by counsel, litigants without lawyers
deserve facilitated, meaningful access to the justice system." 5
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first,
national and statewide conferences focused on the phenomenon
of civil cases involving unrepresented litigants. Common themes
for panels and speakers at the conferences included ethical
issues raised for those encountering unrepresented litigants.3 6
The discussions occurred against a backdrop of statements from
court officials reflecting a growing consensus that it was essential
for courts to provide meaningful access to unrepresented litigants in civil cases.
In 2000, the Conference of State Court Administrators
(COSCA) addressed the general question of the obligation to
assist unrepresented litigants as follows: "The threshold question
in determining how to respond is whether the courts have an
obligation to address the needs of self-represented litigants at all.
The answer should be yes." 37 The following year, the Conference
of Chief Justices (CCJ) promulgated Resolution 23, which
resolved in part to "[r] emove impediments to access to the justice system, including physical, economic, psychological and language barriers.... .s In 2002, the CCJ and COSCAjointly issued
Resolution 31, resolving that "courts have an affirmative obliga33. Kerry Hill, Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: An Update of
Legal and Ethical Issues (August 2000), http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro-legalethical.asp.
34. Id.
35. Editorial, Courts and the Self-Represented-The Road Ahead, 84 JUDICATURE 300, 300 (2001), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/proeditorial.asp.
36.

See supra note 2.

37.

CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, POSITION PAPER ON SELF-REPRE-

(2000), available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/
selfreplitigation.pdf.
38. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 23: Leadership to Promote
Equal Justice (2001), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/AccessTojusticeResolutions/resol
23Leadership.html.
SENTED LITIGATION
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tion to ensure that all litigants have meaningful
access to the
39
courts, regardless of representation status.
The 2001 AJS/SJI publication, Meeting the Pro Se Challenge:An
Update, summarized the wide range of activities that occurred in
the three years following the publication in 1998 of the original
Meeting the Challenge report.4" The author described the process
of state action plans, initiated by the 1999 National Conference
on Pro Se Litigation, held in Scottsdale, Arizona.4 1 She summarized the progress reports submitted by the twenty-three state
leaders responding to AJS's request for updates and described
"other developments" triggered by "the recent focus on pro se
42
litigation.,
The final section of the update for AJS is labeled "Looking
Ahead." The author identified five trends, including the standardizing and simplifying of court forms, rethinking the use of
technology to promote access, simplifying the procedural and
ethical rules, and redefining the role of attorneys and the bar.4
The fifth item, "defining the role of the judge in pro se litigation," captured the shifting attitudes described above and the
challenges that lie ahead:
As the authors found in their research for Meeting the
Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, there is a lack of consensus
among judges about their role in pro se litigation. Some
guidance is emerging in case law and judicial discipline
decisions, in protocols developed at the state level, and in
scholarly comment. The evolution
of the judge's role will
44
take time and bears watching.
B.

Interpretingthe Change

In the 2003 article Judicial Techniquesfor Cases Involving SelfRepresented Litigants, the authors "attempt[ed] to stimulate a
national dialogue about how judges can best structure and manage their courtrooms to accommodate the needs of self-repre39. Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution II: In Support
of a Leadership Role for CCJ and COSCA in the Development, Implementation

and Coordination of Assistance Programs for Self-Represented Litigants (2002),
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/CourtAdmin/resolutionSelfRepresented
Litigants.html. The joint resolution between COSCA and CCJ also endorsed
COSCA's position paper on self-represented litigation. Id.
40. Kathleen M. Sampson, Meeting the Pro Se Challenge: An Update, 84 JUDICATURE 326 (2001), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro-sampson.asp.
41. Id.

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 327.
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sented litigants."4 5 After reviewing the judicial canons in the
ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct, and the protocols developed in
Minnesota, the authors summarized over twenty-five published
decisions from around the country, attempting to organize the
guidance emerging in case law. Their proposed synthesis of judicial techniques starts with general principles, followed by specific
recommendations for the handling of cases involving two unrepresented parties, and then cases involving represented and
unrepresented parties.4 6
The authors' synthesis shows how far the attitudes have
changed from a world in which the formal rules suggested that
unrepresented parties were not to be treated differently from
represented ones. The principles gleaned from the synthesis
counsel judges to prepare for cases involving unrepresented litigants, to provide guidelines, to conduct proceedings in a structured fashion, yet in an informal atmosphere, and to ask
questions.4 7 Where only unrepresented parties are involved,
judges can swear both parties in at the outset, but otherwise
avoid the distinction between argument and testimony, while
maintaining strict control over the proceedings and remaining
alert to power imbalances. 48 In cases involving both represented
and unrepresented parties, the authors report that "[m]ost trial
judges find cases with unequal resources most difficult."4 9 The
authors urge judges to: (1) convince the attorney of the benefits
of proceeding informally; (2) overrule objections likely to be a
waste of judicial resources; (3) set special ground rules for conducting the proceeding under the rules of evidence; and (4) use
leading questions as prompts. 50 The authors also recommend
that judges offer the unrepresented litigant a continuance, if
necessary, to allow the unrepresented litigant to obtain
assistance.5 1
The 2005 AJS/SJI publication, Reaching Out or Overreaching:
Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants, also offers a synthesis
of the case law. 5 2 The author first acknowledges that
"[u]ncertainty among trial judges about how to treat self-represented litigants is understandable given the mixed signals sent by
45.

Albrecht et al., supra note 16, at 16.

46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 45-46.

48.

Id. at 46-47.

49.

Id. at 47.

50.

Id. at 47-48.

51.

Id. at 48.

52.

GRAY, supra note 3.
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appellate courts. '5 3 Case after case insists that "self-represented
litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys," while case
after case also "describes exceptions to that rule .

.

. ."" In a

somewhat different synthesis from that proposed by the authors
of Judicial Techniques, the AJS/SJI publication offers the following: "One way to reconcile these competing holdings affirms that
attorneys and self-represented litigants are held to the same standard-courts should be lenient with both when appropriate to
promote the goal of deciding cases on the merits."5 5
Although published only two years after Judicial Techniques,
Reaching Out or Overreachingreflects that a far more active judicial
role than might have been acceptable even a few years before is
already taking hold. The document offers guidance at all stages
of the proceeding, including explaining the process, instructing
self-represented litigants regarding procedural actions, asking
questions, and handling evidence. The underlying premises of
the recommended "Proposed Best Practices" are: (1) the judge is
more than a mere arbitrator, referee, or moderator; (2) the
judge can control the orderly presentation of evidence; (3) cases
should be decided on the merits; and (4) the rules of procedure
should work to do substantial justice. 56 The document concludes:
"Without raising reasonable questions about impartiality, judges
should exercise discretion [t]o make equitable, procedural
accommodations [and] [t]o provide self-represented
litigants
57
reasonable opportunity to have cases fully heard.
Regarding settlement, the Proposed Best Practices advise
judges to encourage, but not coerce, settlement or mediation.5 8
Once a settlement is presented to the court for approval, judges
should "engage in allocution to determine whether the sef-represented litigant understands the agreement and entered into it
voluntarily;" this process includes determining59 "that any waiver of
substantive rights is knowing and voluntary.
Regarding hearings, the Proposed Best Practices first advise
pre-hearing practices that include explaining the process and
ground rules, explaining the elements and the burden of proof,
explaining the kinds of evidence that can and cannot be considered, and trying to get all parties to agree to relaxed rules of
53.
54.
rule and
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6. As Gray notes, often it is within the same case that both the
exception are announced. Id.
Id.
See id. at 51-57.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 54.
Id.
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procedure so that the hearing can proceed informally.6 ° At the
hearing itself, the Proposed Best Practices advise judges to question witnesses when the facts are confused, undeveloped, or misleading; to follow the rules of evidence generally but use
discretion and overrule objections on technical matters; not to
allow counsel to bully or confuse self-represented litigants; and to
take other steps necessary to prevent obvious injustice.6 1
C. Recent Evidence of a Continuing Shift
In 2006, Massachusetts promulgated its JudicialGuidelinesfor
Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants.6 2 The Massachusetts Guidelines constitute the first new set of state guidelines or
protocols to appear in a decade and reflect the sea change that
occurred in the intervening time. As noted above, Minnesota's
proposed protocol was promulgated a decade before and focuses
on the hearing process.6 3
The Massachusetts Guidelines apply to all phases of the
court's operation. While the Guidelines, which are advisory,
apply to all the courts in the state, the drafters recognize that the
"issues and challenges presented by self-represented litigants may
vary in different court departments" and judges, therefore, "are
encouraged to use the Guidelines in a way that best suits the
needs of their court and the litigants before them. ' 64 Regarding
pre-hearing interaction, the Guidelines encourage judges to
make reasonable efforts to insure litigants understand the trial
process, and authorize judges to explain the elements of claims
and defenses as they would to a jury. 65 At trial, judges may provide self-represented litigants with the opportunity to present
their cases meaningfully, and may ask questions to elicit general
information and obtain clarification; where all parties are self60.
61.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 55-56.

62. SUBCOMM. ON JUDICIAL GUIDELINES, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STEERING COMM. ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL
HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS WITH COMMENTARY (2006)
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES], available at http://www.mass.gov/
courts/judguidelinescivhearingstoc.html.

63. See supra text accompanying note 31. The protocols provide ten procedures for hearing officers to follow, including explaining the process,
explaining the elements, explaining the burden of proof and the kinds of evidence that can and cannot be presented, and asking questions to obtain general information. For the text of the Minnesota Guidelines, see Albrecht et al.,
supra note 16, at 18.
64.

MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES, supra note 62, introductory cmt.

65.

Id. § 2.1 & cmt.
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represented, judges may have the parties stipulate to proceed
informally.6 6 Finally, in approving settlements:
Judges should review the terms of settlement agreements,
even those resulting from ADR, with the parties. Judges
should determine whether the agreement was entered into
voluntarily. If there are specific provisions through which a
self-represented litigant waives substantive rights, judges
possible, whether the
should determine, to the extent
67
waiver is knowing and voluntary.
The commentary provides that, when assessing whether a waiver
of substantive rights is "knowing and voluntary," the judge may
consider how the phrase is used "in the context of informed consent, i.e., the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after receiving adequate information and explanation about
the material risks and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."6 8
Activity in other states reflects increasing attention to the
issues involving unrepresented litigants and the judicial role. In
2007, California promulgated its comprehensive guide, Handling
Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants: A Benchguide for Judicial
Officers.6 9 The New York County Lawyers Association developed
protocols specifically applicable to the New York City Housing
Court, and the extreme problems
facing judges and unrepre70
sented litigants in that context.
As encouraging as many of the developments regarding the
role of the judge may be, it is worth noting that the changes
occurred without any related modification of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. Far from prohibiting a range of behavior and a
shift in attitudes over time, the general nature of the language in
66. Id. § 3.2 & cmt.
67. Id. § 3.4.
68. Id. § 3.4 & cmt. (citing the MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.0(e) (2003)).
69. STATE JUSTICE INST. AND JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2007).

Various chapters of the Guide are included in the materials for the California
Conference on Self-Represented Litigants, held in San Francisco from May
14-18, 2007, which are available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/

equalaccess/2007Materials.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). Chapter 3, which
covers the law applicable to ajudge's ethical duties, is available at http://www.
courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrepO7/Ethical/Chapter3.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
70, A description of the protocols is available at http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/News/News59_2.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the relevance
of context generally, and the New York City Housing Court in particular, see
infra Part IV.C.
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the Model Code inevitably permits and encourages the variation
among judges and courts, both at any given moment and over
time. Moreover, the Code language not only permits the shift,
but the current efforts to modify the Model Code provide further
evidence of the shift.
The most recent revision of the Model Code, formally triggered by the 2003 appointment of the Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, was approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in February, 2007. The issue of cases
involving unrepresented litigants was only one of many topics
under consideration, with other provisions of the Code garnering far more attention and controversy. 71 The provision regarding unrepresented litigants nonetheless was the subject of an
array of comments reflecting many of the tensions discussed in
this Article. Consistent with the trend favoring increased assistance to unrepresented litigants, the language adopted makes
clear that "[i] t is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make
reasonable accommodations to ensure pro7 2se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard."
Perhaps it is inevitable that the language reflects a compromise. In a code of general applicability, official acknowledgment
of change will be slower and more cautious than a number of
commentators urged. 7 1 At the same time, even the cautious language is consistent with a transition that is moving steadily in a
single direction: the provision of increasing assistance by the
judiciary to unrepresented litigants. As with the official resolutions from COSCA and the CCJ, the ABA's language is in the
direction of more help than in the past.74 Disciplinary decisions
over the past decade show discipline imposed against judges for
bias and hostility toward unrepresented litigants, with not a sin71. See, e.g., Editorial, The A.B.A. 's JudicialEthics Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2007, at A18; Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Adopts Policies Revising Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
abanet/media/release/news-release.cfm?releaseid=80.
72. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2007).
73. See, e.g., Richard Zorza, The Implications of the Growth of Pro Se Litigation for the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Testimony Before the A.B.A.
Joint Commission on the Evaluation on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/
commcodezorza_120503.pdf (urging the use of bolder language in the
Code); see also JENNIFER JUHLER & MARK CADY, IOWA SUPREME COURT & IOWA
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, MORALITY, DECISION-MAKING AND JUDICIAL ETHIcS, available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/

commcodecady-undated.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (urging significant
judicial involvement in domestic violence cases).
74.

See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.

380

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 22

gle reported case of discipline imposed against a judge trying to
provide more help.7 5 Even the vigorous debate in the commentary, captured above, is a debate over how far to go, and not in
what direction to move. 76 At every turn, the evidence from the
past decade confirms the continuing shift.
III.

UNDERSTANDING ETHICS AS DYNAMIC

The dialogue underscores the accuracy of the observation in
Meeting the Challenge: An Update that guidance is emerging and
that the evolution of the judge's role will take time and bears
watching. At the same time, the more recent guidance reflects
the dramatic shift that has occurred over the past decade and
remains in progress. The Proposed Best Practices from Reaching
Out or Overreachinggo far beyond the predominantly procedural
steps captured in the proposed protocol from Minnesota. The
Proposed Best Practices also differ dramatically from the more
tentative recommendations captured in 1998 in Meeting the Challenge, and even go further than the recommendations published
in Judicial Techniques in 2003. The Massachusetts Guidelines are
different still, reinforcing the notion that context matters: "[t] he
issues and challenges presented by self-represented litigants may
vary in different court departments. 7 7 Not surprisingly, when
the ABA announced in 2003 the appointment of a joint commission to evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the ABA
President observed: 'Judicial ethics are not static ....

It has been

twelve years since the ABA took a good, hard look at the
code ....

78

It is hardly surprising that our notion of judicial ethics in
cases involving unrepresented litigants is both context-based and
in flux, given the nature of the evolution of ethical norms generally. Discussing the importance of context in analyzing professional regulation and ethics, Professor David Wilkins contends
that "the traditional claim that a uniform set of ethical rules and
enforcement practices governs all lawyers in all contexts is both
descriptively false and normatively unattractive."79 Regarding the
evolution of ethics, the Professional Responsibility Section of the
75. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. MASSACHUSETrS GUIDELINES, supra note 62, introductory cmt.
78. Dennis W. Archer Jr., Am. Bar Ass'n President, Remarks Made at
Announcement of the Joint Commission, available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/about.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
79. David B. Wilkins, Afterword: How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-Managing Conflict and Context in ProfessionalRegulation, 65 FORtHAM L. REV. 465, 482 (1996).
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Association of American Law Schools (AALS) recently held an
essay contest in which contestants were to envision ethics in the
year 2050, recognizing that change inevitably will occur.8 0 As Professor Failinger observes in her introduction to the symposium
issue: "So long as ethics problems are human problems, technological advances and institutional restructuring will add some
new ethical complexity for every problem that they eliminate."8"
Professors Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton captured the point even
more broadly in the opening chapter of their landmark Lawyering Process textbook, where they addressed pressures of conformity as new lawyers enter the legal profession: "We often forget
that much of what is accepted as true and unalterable in the legal
or any social system is, in fact, provisional and contingent-a
product of chance and particular social, economic and historical
82
circumstances rather than immutable laws."
Beyond the rules of judicial ethics, the evolution of the ethical rules governing lawyers, from the old Canons, to the Model
Code, to the Model Rules, provides one example of how the ethical rules have changed in light of our changing experience and
changing times. Although beyond the scope of this article, an
analysis of the controversies surrounding the adoption of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is instructive for any effort
to achieve formal changes of ethical rules; according to critics of
the process, what began as an attempt to provide meaningful guidance in the face of changing times and attitudes triggered backlash by self-interested members of the organized bar, producing
a disappointingly "parochial" set of rules.8 3 The stated reasons
for recent changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
included the growing disparity in state ethics rules, the changing

80. Symposium, ProfessionalResponsibility Section Essay Contest: Ethics in the
Year 2050, 15 WIDENER L. J. 235 (2006). Judge Jack Weinstein observed years
ago in his discussion of the teaching of legal ethics: "In a number of instances,
changes in the practice of law have created new ethical problems, demanding
new approaches and requiring substantial rethinking." Jack Weinstein, On the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 463 (1972).
81. Marie A. Failinger, Introduction, 15 WIDENER L.J. 235, 238 (2006).

82. GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 11 (1978).
83. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthicalRules?, 59
L. REv. 639 (1981); Gerald J. Clark, New Rule of Professional Conduct for
Massachusetts: A Dissent, 27 THE ADvocATE 39 (1997); Stephen Gillers, What We
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985).
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organization and structure of modern law practice, and the
increased public scrutiny of lawyers.8 4
Some changes in ethical rules have been necessitated by a
changing world, with the ethical rules often the last place that
the change is reflected. The dramatic changes in technology
have created a host of problems for the formal rules, which were
drafted long before the world was familiar with personal computers, electronic mail, and the internet. Our norms and expectations regarding issues such as client confidentiality and the
development of an attorney-client relationship are in flux as
attorneys now are able to consult with clients in other states over
the internet. The Ethics 2000 Commission made some rule
changes in light of the "[n]ew issues and questions raised by the
influence that technological developments are having on the
delivery of legal services. "85
With the issue of unrepresented litigants, the traditional
roles of court-connected mediators and courts clerks are challenged in a manner similar to the challenges facing judges. With
court personnel generally, the formal rule that prohibits the giving of "legal advice" is often found to be unworkable. Court personnel struggle to understand the distinction between legal
information and legal advice, while attempting to provide assistance specific enough to be of help to unrepresented litigants in
handling their cases. Not surprisingly, emerging guidelines steer
clear of the legal advice versus legal information distinction in
favor of a more useful list of "do's" and "do not's," even though
the formal prohibition against giving legal advice has not been
eliminated.8 6
A similar evolution is underway in the area of "unbundled"
legal services or "discrete task assistance." The practice of providing assistance short of full representation is hardly new; legal ser84.

CHARLOrrE (BECKY) STRETCH, OVERVIEW OF ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-ov-marO2.doc (last visited
Mar. 16, 2008).
85. Id. In light of the realities of practice, the changes to the Model Rules
do not begin to resolve the plethora of ethical questions triggered by the
changes in technology. See, e.g., WILLIAM HORNSBY, ABA STANDING COMM. ON
AND

REPORT,

THE DELIVERY

OF LEGAL SERVICES,

IMPROVING

THE

DELIVERY OF AFFORDABLE

(1999), http://www.unbundledlaw.
org/program/11%20-%20Lawyering%20over%20web%20-%20hornsby.pdf;
Jeffrey M. Aresty & Peter D. Lepsch, ProfessionalResponsibility in a Global World: A
Lawyer's Role Redefined in the Age of the Virtual Practice, 8 NEW ENG. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 37 (2002), available at http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol8/aresty_
v8n 1.pdf; Peter Jaffe, Legal Practitioners Take Note: Virtual Layering Has Arrived,
THE NAT'L LJ., June 19, 2000, at B15.
86. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1; Greacen, supra note 7.
LEGAL SERVICES THROUGH THE

INTERNET
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vices lawyers have provided legal advice and assistance through
hotlines, pro se clinics, and the preparation of pro se pleadings
for years without explicit treatment of these programs in the text
of the ethical rules. Many private lawyers perform similar tasks,
although often under the cloud of being sanctioned for ghostwriting, or they are forced to undertake full representation. Yet,
the effort to expand and formalize this practice-partly in
response to the high incidence of unmet legal needs and high
costs of hiring attorneys-has faced strong resistance from many
in the organized bar. Over time, through a similar evolution
inspired by conferences, publications, and meetings, a change in
attitudes favoring unbundled legal services is evident across the
country, reflected in part by changes in ethical and procedural
rules in many jurisdictions.8 7
A final example involves the role of the judge apart from
cases involving unrepresented litigants. Scholars have noted for
years the changing role of judges with respect to techniques for
managing their dockets, or for dealing with particularly complex
litigation.8 8 More recently, "problem-solving courts," such as
drug courts, mental health courts, and domestic violence courts,
are emerging across the country, creating new challenges and
modified roles for the judges who preside in those courts.8 9 The
community courts have developed, from a similar desire to solve
problems more effectively than the solutions the traditional,
adversarial courts have been able to craft, and carry with them a
changing role for judges as well.9"
87. For a state-by-state analysis and updates of unbundled legal services
and discrete task representation, see "Unbundled" Legal Services, A Look at
What Is Happening Around the Country, http://www.unbundledlaw.org/
States/states.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). In the Model Rules, the adoption
of Rule 6.5, which concerns "nonprofit and court-annexed limited legal services
programs," provides one illustration of the modification of rules to facilitate the
changing needs of practice. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 6.5 (2007).
88. Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges
Will Help, 73 FoRDHAM L. REV. 969, 977 (2004).
89. Id. at nn.57-58; see also Greg Berman &John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving
Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 Law & Pol'y 125 (2001), available at.//www.courtinnovation.org/-uploads/documents/p-s%20court%20primer%20PDF3.pdf; Judith
S. Kaye, DeliveringJustice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 125 (2004). See generally, Center for Court Innovation, http://www.court
innovation.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
90. See, e.g., Rolando Acosta, The Birth of a Problem-Solving Court, 29 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1758, 1759 (2002) (arguing that problem-solving courts have
evolved from the recognized failure of the court system to deal effectively with
cases that are characterized by a confluence of social, legal, and human
problems).
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TowARDs AN IMPARTIAL COURT SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES

JUSTICE FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS

A. Articulating Core Principles For Understandingthe Proper
Judicial Role
As many of the examples above illustrate, the evolution of
ethics is a dynamic process. The area of judicial ethics is no
exception. 9 That realization makes it even more important to
understand the full extent of the problems facing courts flooded
with unrepresented litigants, to envision the full range of solutions permissible under existing rules, and to adjust our attitudes
to allow judicial ethics to be part of the solution rather than part
of the problem. A crucial component of the process of crafting
effective solutions involves insuring that the problems have been
properly framed in the first place. Where a range of permissible
responses exists, identifying core principles to help guide the discussion is crucial.
Many discussions framing the problem recognize that the
92
flood of unrepresented litigants creates challenges for judges.
The scenarios similarly cause problems for court-connected
mediators, court clerks, other court personnel, and opposing
counsel.9 3 The solutions we craft must respond to these
challenges.
That is not, however, the full scope of the problem. On a
daily basis in courts across the country, unrepresented litigants
are forfeiting important rights and denied meaningful access to
justice-not due to the governing law and facts of their cases, but
due to the absence of counsel. Those familiar with the courts
may disagree as to how large or small this category of cases may
be. Part of the agenda for anyone attempting to address the
problems is the development of reliable evaluation tools to identify the litigants in this category. What is beyond dispute is that
the problem is real, widespread, and devastating for litigants
seeking justice in the courts. That the absence of counsel leads to
the forfeiture of rights is evident from various reports, confer-

91. The formal rules are often the last to reflect the changes. Moreover,
in each area, it is a mistake to assume that the formal rules on paper reflect the

actual practice. For a troubling example involving widespread violations of the
ethical rules governing lawyer negotiations with unrepresented litigants, see
Engler, supra note 8, passim.

92.

See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.

93.

Greacen, supra note 7.
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ences, and litigation seeking appointment of counsel and must
be taken as a given as we craft solutions. 4
This reality underscores the need to recognize general principles that must guide the discussion of the proper role not only
for the judge, but also for other court personnel.9 5 First, the
stated goal of our system of justice is to provide fairness and justice. Our traditional understanding of the proper roles of the
players in the system was developed under rules that imply that
unrepresented litigants are the exception, not the rule, in our
adversary system. Given the realities of many of our courts in the
early twenty-first century, our traditional understanding of the
roles is frustrating-rather than furthering-the goal of fairness
and justice. As between abandoning the goal or changing the
roles, we should not abandon the goal.9 6
Second, we must revise our notion of impartiality. We can
no longer accept the idea that impartiality equals passivity. To
the contrary, a system that favors those with lawyers over those
without lawyers, without regard to the applicable law and the
facts of a case, is a partial (rather than impartial) system. To
avoid having a system that penalizes those without lawyers, the
courts in general, and judges specifically, must be prepared to
play an active role to maintain the system's impartiality: "the
judge .

.

. must be as active as necessary to ensure that the legal

system's promise of fairness and substantial justice is not frustrated by the litigant's appearance without a lawyer."9 7 This concept is easier to accept where all sides are unrepresented, and
more challenging where one side is represented. Yet, that is the
scenario in which the active role of the judge is most important.
As long as the judge is equally prepared to help all sides, as
needed, the problem is not one of impartiality, but the appear94. For descriptions of the operations of various courts involving unrepresented litigants, see, for example, Engler, supra note 1, at 2047-69 and
Engler, supra note 8, at 104-30. For an overview of studies discussing the impact
of counsel, including a comparison of outcomes in similar cases involving represented and unrepresented litigants, see Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most
Needed (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
95. For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see Engler, supra
note 1, at 2022-27.
96. Cf GRAY, supra note 3, at 48 ("The adversary system is not ensconced
in the code ofjudicial conduct, nor is the primary purpose of the code to protect the formalities of the adversary system.").
97. Engler, supra note 1, at 2028. I rejected the notion that the active role
amounts to a violation of the duty to remain impartial: "[T] he call for judges to
provide vigorous assistance to unrepresented litigants is consistent with the
need for impartiality." Id.
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ance of impartiality. The solution is to provide clear guidelines
and explanations, not to require the judges to sit back passively
regardless of the unfairness that follows in terms of process or
outcome.
Third, we must revisit our notions of voluntariness where
unrepresented litigants are involved. The operation of many of
our courts still depends on an assumption that those without
counsel are "choosing" to "self-represent." It also assumes that
their choices along the way, such as whether to settle or go to
trial, what witnesses and evidence to produce, or on what terms
to settle, are "voluntary" if they are understood and not the product of coercion. Yet, in a world with a widely documented
shortage of lawyers for the poor in civil cases, courts must recognize that a litigant's appearance without counsel is most often
compelled, not voluntary. Regarding the individual decisions
made by litigants, we should be using a standard akin to
"informed consent," accepting as voluntary only the choices
made by litigants aware of their options and the advantages and
disadvantages of those options.98
Fourth, we should remember that the roles of the players
are interconnected, and that context matters. How active a judge
must be depends in part on how much assistance the litigant
receives before appearing before the judge. The more that clerks
and other personnel are permitted to provide extensive assistance, and the more that assistance is supplemented by creative
and effective assistance programs, the less the judge must do,
while, nonetheless, retaining overall responsibility for the fairness of the proceeding. Similarly, what is necessary and proper
for a judge in the context of a high-volume court flooded with
unrepresented litigants may be different from what seems proper
in a different setting. The range of judicial actions is not only
appropriate, but consistent with the Canons of Judicial Conduct.
The court decision in Oko v. Rogers remains instructive: "The
heavy responsibility of ensuring a fair trial in . . . a situation

[involving a pro se litigant] rests directly on the trial judge. The
buck stops there."9 9 The buck does stop with the judge, and the
98. Cf. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2007) (defining
"informed consent"). The Massachusetts Guidelines encourage judges to consider the standard of informed consent in determining whether waivers of
rights by unrepresented litigants in settlement agreements are "knowing and
voluntary." See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99. Oko v. Rogers, 446 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). As the
authors of Judicial Techniques observe, "[t]his is the only case we found that is
directly on point for the issue addressed in this article." Albrecht et al., supra
note 16, at 42.
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judge is responsible for ensuring the fairness of his judgment
and orders, and procedures that produce them.
B.

The Scholarly Critique of the Passive Role

The principles articulated above are at odds with the narrow
view equating the requirement of impartiality with the need for
judges to perform their roles in a passive way. A growing number
of commentators have called for a rejection of the passive role.
The commentators argue not only that the more active role is
ethically permissible, but also that it is necessary to avoid a partial
system that favors those with lawyers and in which unrepresented
litigants are denied meaningful access to justice due to the
absence of counsel. They weigh in with views closer to the
approach I articulated in my 1999 article than to the more limited role endorsed by the authors of JudicialTechniques and Reaching Out or Overreaching.
Dr. Jona Goldschmidt rejects the idea that impartiality
equals passivity and urges judges to be far more active in the
adversary process.1"' Goldschmidt, co-author of Meeting the Challenge, proposes guidelines for judges and court personnel consistent with the principle that impartiality does not equal passivity.
The authors of JudicialTechniques, while agreeing thatjudges cannot maintain a passive role, "do not necessarily espouse all [of
Dr. Goldschmidt's] recommendations for a more active role for
judges and court staff. 1

1

Fresh on the heels of that statement, however, Richard
Zorza, one of the four authors of Judicial Techniques, published an
article on his own that in fact urges a far more active role than
the Judicial Techniques authors articulated. Zorza's "core thesis is
that our focus on the appearanceof judicial neutrality has caused
us improperly to equate judicial engagement with judicial nonneutrality, and therefore to resist the forms of judicial engagement that are in fact required to guarantee true neutrality."10 2 As
Zorza explains, "U]udicial neutrality and judicial passivity are
very different, and should not be confused;" the "appearance of
neutrality" and "true neutrality" are very different in the pro se
context, "and true neutrality often requires a form of engagement that may seem inconsistent with traditional expectations
for the appearance of neutrality."'10 3 According to Zorza, the
100. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36 (2002).
101. Albrecht et al., supra note 16, at 45.
102. Zorza, supra note 10, at 425.
103. Id. at 426.
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apparent contradiction "can be resolved by the development of a
transparent style of judging, in which judicial engagement
is
10 4
demonstrated to be in the service of true neutrality.

Professor Deborah Rhode urges courts to assist unrepresented litigants as part of the goal of providing access to justice.1" 5 Building on my work, as well as the Goldschmidt and
Zorza pieces, Professor Russell Pearce urged a model of the
judge's role closer to the inquisitorial system, if that is what is
required to provide access to justice for those without counsel.
According to Professor Pearce, "[r] ather than serving as a passive
umpire, judges should be active umpires responsible for remedying process errors that would deprive the court of relevant evidence and arguments
and that would ensure informed consent
10 6
to settlements.

Most recently, Professor Paris Baldacci, focusing on the particular problems of the New York City Housing Court, organizes
the commentary into three types of models for change: (1) a
"more active judicial role within the strictures of the present system," (2) "incorporating the simplified evidentiary procedures
applicable to small claims actions," and (3) "adopting an administrative procedure or inquisitorial model in which the judge
bears an affirmative duty to develop the factual record and identify the controlling law."1 7 While acknowledging that the various
proposals "challenge our adversarial system's received traditions
of judicial passivity and impartiality, narrowly understood," Professor Baldacci proposes, "as have other commentators, a10more
8
active, inquisitorial-based role for Housing Court judges."
C.

The Importance of Context

Professor Baldacci's focus on the New York City Housing
Court illustrates that the needs of unrepresented litigants vary
from context to context, and that effective responses must be tailored to particular contexts. For example, studies of housing
courts across the country routinely show that the provision of
counsel to the tenant is a crucial factor affecting case outcomes
104. Id.
105. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUsTICE 81-86 (2004) (discussing the
increase in pro se litigants and the problems that are inherent therein).
106. Pearce, supra note 88, at 977 (2004).
107. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in
Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City's Housing Court, 3
CARozo PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 659 (2006).
108. Id. at 696.
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and preventing eviction.' 09 Yet, studies also show that landlords
typically prevail against unrepresented tenants-and they do so
with shocking speed-regardless of whether the landlord is represented or not.110
Professor Baldacci articulates working hypotheses that
explain why certain forms of assistance may not be sufficient in
particularly intractable contexts. He observes " [t] he fundamental
problem for pro se litigants in having their defenses or claims
heard is not primarily their lack of information or understanding, but the structural dynamics in Housing Court which work to
silence the pro se litigant even when she has some knowledge
regarding defenses or claims." 11 '
The example of housing courts highlights the importance of
context in determining the level of help necessary in a particular
court or case. The help needed in certain housing courts may be
different from what is needed in courts handling family law matters, and both may be different from courts handling other civil
109. See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 461, 485 (2003); Carroll Seron et al., The
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing
Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAw & Soc'v REv. 419, 420 (2001);
Russell Engler & Craig S. Bloomgarden, Summary Process Actions in Boston
Housing Court: An Empirical Study and Recommendations for Reform 5 (May
20, 1983), http://www.nesl.edu/clsr/projects/PSP/EnglerPubs/EnglerBloom
garden.pdf.
110. The titles themselves are disturbing and revealing. See, e.g., THE WILLiAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUST., INJUSTICE IN No TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF
TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE COURTS 8 (2005), http://www.lawhelp.
org/documents/254961 Final%20eviction%20report-P%20063.06.05.pdf
(eighty-seven percent of landlords represented); LAWYER'S COMM. FOR BETTER
HOUSING,

No

TIME FOR JUSTICE:

A

STUDY OF CHICAGO'S EVICTION COURT

13

(2003), http://www.lcbh.org/pdf/full-report.pdf (fifty-three percent of land-

lords represented);

MONITORING SUBCOMM., CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUSING
COURT, 5 MINUTE JUSTICE OR "AIN'T NOTHING GOING ON BUT THE RENT!"

(1986).
111.
Baldacci, supra note 107, at 661-62. In reaching his hypotheses,
Baldacci relies not only on studies of the New York City Housing Court, id. at
660 n.3, but also on Professor Barbara Bezdek's seminal study of Baltimore's
Rent Court, Silence In The Court: Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants'
Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). Professor Baldacci posits
these additional hypotheses:
Pro se litigants usually have only a very generalized understanding
regarding both the defenses and claims relevant to their cases and
regarding how to present those defenses or claims to the trier of
fact .... The root cause of this systemic silencing may be, in part, a
slavish adherence to what is perceived to be the strictures of the adversarial system, including the resulting notions of the appropriate role of
judges in such a system.
Baldacci, supra note 107, at 661-62.
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matters. The analysis regarding the need for more active judicial
help requires a similar process to that which courts must undertake to determine the level of help unrepresented litigants need.
Almost a decade ago, I proposed the following six factors as a
starting point for this analysis:
(1) The prevalence of unrepresented litigants in the court
generally; (2) the volume of cases the court typically handles; (3) the complexity of the proceeding(s); (4) the
adversarial or contested nature of the proceeding(s); (5)
the extent to which cases regularly pit an unrepresented
to which a
party against a represented one; (6) the extent
112
parties.
the
between
exists
imbalance
power
Where these factors suggest that help is necessary to avoid the
routine forfeiture of important rights by litigants without counsel, judges must play a more active role.
Tailoring responses to a particular context is not unusual as
courts struggle to respond to the volume of cases in which litigants appear without counsel. For example, courts handling family law and housing matters are among the courts seeing the
highest incidence of unrepresented litigants.113 Not surprisingly,
those same courts, and advocates practicing in the areas of family
law and housing law, are in the forefront of the movement to
identify innovative ways to respond to the growing crisis." 4
Pilot programs involving limited representation, appearances by lay advocates, and court-based assistance programs often
involve rule changes or revised interpretations of existing rules;
they are also typically targeted to high-volume courts."' Case law
112. Engler, supra note 1, at 2044-46. For a more detailed explanation of
the factors, see id.
113. See, e.g., id. at 2047-52, 2057-69; see also infra note 115 and accompanying text.
114. Engler, supra note 1, at 1998-2007, 2065-66 (describing initiatives to
help unrepresented litigants in New York City Housing Court); see alsoJohn M.
Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants: Learningfrom Ten Years of Experience in Family
Courts, 44 JUDGES' J. 24 (2005); N.Y. CoUNTY LAWYER'S Ass'N, supra note 9;
Bonnie Rose Hough, Evaluation of Innovation Designed to Increase Access to Justice
for Self-Represented Litigants, in THE FUTURE OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION

109, 109-18, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResProSeFutSelf
RepLitfinalPub.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2008); Bainbridge D. Testa, New Housing Ct. ChiefPlans to Expand Volunteer Program,MASS. LAw. WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2003,
at 1; Neil Steiner, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of a Limited Assistance Outreach Project to Low-Income Tenants Facing Eviction (Oct. 14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
115. For example, unbundling, limited representation, and lawyer-forthe-day programs often begin in the family law and housing areas. A prominent

role for lay advocates involves victim witness advocates in domestic violence settings. See, e.g., ROBYN MAZUR & LIBERTY ALDRICH, WHAT MAKES A DoMESTic Vio-
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and administrative rules applicable to particular contexts often
do the same, as illustrated by the standards for the approval, or
subsequent vacatur of, stipulations in the New York City Housing
Court; where the stipulations involve unrepresented litigants, the
of the courts and litigants
judge must consider the characteristics
16
analysis.'
required
the
in
If the need to tailor responses to particular contexts is not
new, neither is the image of an active judge directed both to
maintain impartiality and provide substantive justice. Small
claims courtjudges are bound by the duty of impartiality, but still
are typically required to discover relevant facts and provide justice. "" Administrative law judges must remain impartial, but they
also have a duty to develop the record and provide extensive
assistance."" Similarly, judges in problem-solving and community courts go far beyond the traditional role ofjudges developed
in the adversarial setting. 1 9
Indiana's 1997 Advisory Opinion on Judicial Qualifications
prescribes a more active role for judges "in a non-adversarial set1 20
ting" to avoid inappropriate and avoidable denials of relief.
Using examples of litigants seeking a name change or simple
LENCE COURT WORK? LESSONS FROM NEW YORK 3 (2003), available at http://www.
courtinnovation.org/pdf/what.makesdvcourt-work.pdf.
Administrative Notice (AN LT-10) (1997), discussed in N.Y.
116. See, e.g.,
CouNTY LAWYER'S Ass'N, supra note 9, at 16. Decisions involving the vacatur of
stipulations permit vacatur where stipulations are unduly harsh and one-sided,
particularly where vulnerable litigants waive important rights. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Frutiger, 272 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1971); Solack Estates, Inc. v. Goodman,
45 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Term 1979), affd 432 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1980);
Amsterdam Co. v. Levy, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 14 (App. Term.); McAvoy v.
Chaplin, N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1983, at 13 (App. Term.); Cabbad v. Melendez, 81
A.D.2d 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); 144 Woodruff Corp. v. LaCrete, 154 Misc. 2d
301 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992). Available evidence, however, suggests that the protecEngler, supra note 8, at
tions exist on paper, rather than in reality. See, e.g.,
142-43; N.Y. CouNTY LAWYER'S Ass'N, supra note 9, at 16.
117. While small claims courts are structured to provide a forum in which
litigants may have their cases heard fairly without the need to retain counsel,
ample evidence indicates that, in cases such as debt collection, the rights of
unrepresented litigants are trampled in small claims court cases where the
unrepresented litigants face "repeat players" represented by counsel. See, e.g.,
Engler, supra note 8, at 118-22. The Boston Globe published a four-part "spotlight series" exploring this issue. Debtors' Hell, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30-Aug. 2,
(last visited
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/specials/debt/
Mar. 11, 2008).
118. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 2017.
119. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
120. Ind. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, Advisory Opinion 1-97 at 1,
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/docs/adops/1-97.pdf (last
visited Jan. 30, 2008).
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divorce, the opinion advises that it is not improper for judges to
assist litigants who "ha[ve] failed in some minor or technical way,
or on an uncontroverted or easily established issue .

,,121 As

many of our courts focus on unrepresented litigants, maintaining
a rigid distinction between "adversarial" and "non-adversarial"
settings is harder to defend. The variation in individual practices,
evident in the reports and conferences, demonstrates that certain judges are far more active than the narrow vision of judicial
impartiality would suggest.
D. JudicialEthics at a Crucial Cross-Roads
1. The Active Role Is Necessary in Particular Contexts
Judicial Techniques, Reaching Out or Overreaching,and the Massachusetts Guidelines reflect the progress made over the past
decade in recognizing the need for judges to assist unrepresented litigants and the techniques at judges' disposal for doing
so within the confines of the ethical rules governing judges. At
the same time, however, the documents stop short of endorsing
more active steps that may be necessary to avoid outcomes that
are unfair or unjust to unrepresented litigant-not due to the
facts of their case and applicable law, but due to the absence of
counsel. None explicitly asserts that impartiality requires an
active judicial role in a context in which unrepresented litigants
routinely forfeit important rights due to the absence of counsel.
None proposes that the tools be mandatory in targeted contexts,
as opposed to discretionary. None frames the debate in terms of
measuring the level of assistance needed in relation to what is
necessary to avoid particular outcomes that are unjust and unfair
based on the facts of the case and the governing law.
Recall the tools urged by the authors of Judicial Techniques.
Judges should prepare, provide guidelines and explanations, create an informal, yet structured, atmosphere, and ask questions.
They should remain alert to power imbalances, avoid losing control of the proceeding, set special ground rules for objections,
and attempt to convince attorneys of the benefits of proceeding
litigant a coninformally. Judges might offer the unrepresented
1 22
tinuance and the option to seek assistance.
These techniques may afford a litigant meaningful access to
justice and may prevent a forfeiture of the litigant's rights due to
the absence of counsel in some cases. The problem occurs where
the techniques are not sufficient to do so. A continuance does
121.
122.

Id.

Id.
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not guarantee that the litigant will return with counsel in a country with widely-documented unmet legal needs and a desperate
shortage of available counsel for those who cannot afford to hire
their own. Directing the litigant to seek assistance will not be
enough if the available assistance is not sufficient to protect the
litigant from suffering an unfair result. The unrepresented litigant still may not be able to hold her own in the heat of the
battle in the courtroom, or in the hallway outside the courtroom.
Even with informal proceedings, relaxed rules of evidence, and
lengthy explanations, some unrepresented litigants will still forfeit their rights due to the absence of counsel. The NewYork City
Housing Court illustrates the point: simply insuring that a litigant understands settlement terms will be insufficient in a context in which litigants have only a generalized understanding of
their rights and are silenced23by the structural dynamics of the
court in which they appear.'
The Massachusetts Guidelines reveal shortcomings as well.
As noted above, the Guidelines, and accompanying commentary,
wisely urge judges to try to determine whether settlement agreements were entered into voluntarily, to ascertain whether a
waiver of substantive rights by unrepresented litigants is "knowing and voluntary," and to consider the phrase "'knowing and
voluntary' as that phrase is used in the context of informed consent."'1 24 Yet the same commentary, relying on a 1996 guide published before the dramatic changes over the past decade, reports
that "there is no consensus on the extent to which judges are
obligated to ensure that
settlement agreements are substantively
25
fair and reasonable."1

The settlement provisions highlight the larger limitation
with the Massachusetts Guidelines: they are simply "advisory."126
They were developed "to assistjudges in recognizing the areas in
which they have discretion and to assist them in the exercise of
that discretion."' 27 However wise the Guidelines may be, as long
as they are advisory and discretionary, judges are free to ignore
them, except to the extent that failure to take certain discretion123.

See Baldacci, supra note 107, at 661.
supra note 62, § 3.4 cmt. The Commentary cites Rule 1.0(e) from the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
quotes the definition in the Model Rules, and more generally defines informed
consent as "the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
receiving adequate information and explanation about the material risks and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." Id.

124.

MASSACHUSETrS GUIDELINES,

125.

Id. (citing GOLDSCHMIDT & MILORD, supra note 3, at 53).

126.
127.

Id.
Id.
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ary actions rises to the level of an abuse of discretion. This is true
regardless of how much help an individual litigant may need, or
how routinely litigants in a particular context may need extensive
assistance.
A similar limitation applies to the Proposed Best Practices
encouraged in Reaching Out or Overreaching. The document
instructs that judges "may" and "should" exercise their discretion
to make equitable procedural accommodations and to provide
self-represented litigants a reasonable opportunity to be
heard.1 28 Yet, if the matter is left to the discretion of individual
judges, nothing compels judges to take these discretionary steps.
Moreover, there are no guarantees that even these important
steps-making equitable procedural accommodations and providing litigants a reasonable opportunity to be heard-will provide the assistance some litigants need to avoid forfeiting
important rights and obtain meaningful access to justice, simply
because they are unrepresented.
Where the roles envisioned for judges by Judicial Techniques,
Reaching Out or Overreaching,or the Massachusetts Guidelines do
not permit judges to provide the help litigants need in particular
contexts, we must consider the consequences of that decision.
Wherever the line is drawn, judges will not be permitted to take
certain actions. As long as the prohibited actions are unrelated to
the issue of whether those without counsel suffer unfair or unjust
outcomes due to the absence of counsel, the concerns raised in
this article are not implicated.
Where, however, the judicial actions are necessary to prevent unfair or unjust outcomes, the insistence on prohibiting
judges from playing that role is troubling. The interrelationship
between judges and other players in the system underscores the
danger of finalizing the judicial role in a vacuum, without regard
to context. If court personnel, for example, are permitted to play
an expansive role, or if our evaluation tools demonstrate that
assistance programs are sufficient, or if a particular forum has a
sufficient supply of advocates, it will be easier for judges to preside over fair proceedings and avoid unjust results. The key is not
that judges must do certain things beyond maintaining the ultimate responsibility for the proceedings before them, but that the
system as a whole129must be structured to provide justice for those
without counsel.

128. GOLDSCMIDT ET AL., supra note 1, at 89.
129. As stated above, the roles are interconnected, and how one role
must be shaped depends on the context, the needs of the unrepresented liti-

gants, and the roles of other players available to help. See supra Part IV.A (para-
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We are at a crossroads where no other player in the system
can provide the assistance necessary to prevent unfair or unjust
outcomes, and our attitudes prohibit the judges from doing so.
One solution is to admit, publicly and frankly, that our court system simply cannot provide justice for those without lawyers in
that subset of cases. This solution would be disappointing for a
system that promises justice to all and which utilizes images of
balanced scales ofjustice. At least the "solution" would be honest.
A second solution is to isolate these most troubling cases and
develop a consensus, whether in the courts or the legislatures,
that the time has come for a right to counsel in certain civil cases,
also called a "Civil Gideon."1 3 If counsel is available to protect
litigants, the concerns regarding the rights of unrepresented litigants and the role of judges are no longer implicated.13 1
graph discussing the fourth general principle guiding the role of the judge and
other court personnel).
130. I have discussed elsewhere the extent to which the more active participation of the players in the court system, including judges, is a key component to an "access to justice" strategy that seeks to provide justice for litigants in
civil cases without requiring appointment of counsel at public expense for all
litigants in all cases. See Russell Engler, Towards a Context-Based Civil Gideon
Through Access to Justice Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 196 (2006). That

strategy involves three interrelated components. First, the key players in the
legal system, including judges, court-connected mediators, and clerks, should
be required to provide assistance as necessary to insure that unrepresented litigants do not forfeit important rights due to the absence of counsel. Second, the
expanded roles should be supplemented by assistance programs, short of full
representation by a lawyer in court. Both steps must be accompanied by rigorous evaluation to identify which programs and techniques are successful in
stemming the forfeiture of rights in particular contexts and which simply
relieve pressure on the courts without altering the outcomes. Third, a civil right
to counsel should attach where the expanded roles of the key players and assistance programs cannot stem the forfeiture of important rights of unrepresented litigants. For a discussion of the importance of understanding the Civil
Gideon initiative as an exercise in effectuating social change rather than framing legal claims, see Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideonfrom the
Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 697 (2006).

131. Thus, the move should be supported not only by advocates for the
poor, but judges, court-connected mediators, clerks and other court personnel,
lawyers, and lay advocates across the country. In August 2006, the ABA's House
of Delegates adopted Resolution 112A, urging the provision of "legal counsel as
a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories of
adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody," as determined by
each jurisdiction. AM. BAR ASS'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 12A (2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A12A.
pdf. For a more detailed discussion of efforts through litigation and legislation
to obtain an expanded right to appointed counsel in civil cases, see Special Issue,
A Right to a Lawyer? Momentum Crows, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 163-293 (2006).
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Viewed in this light, the active judicial role is wise policy in
terms of marshaling scarce resources in the effort to provide
access to justice. Revising the roles of the players, including
judges, is the most cost-effective response to the problem
because it involves modifying roles for existing players rather
than demanding new resources. Where litigants receive the help
that they need either from the expanded roles of those within
the court system or from the assistance programs that are available in many courts across the country, full representation by a
lawyer may not be necessary. But, where the revised roles and
assistance programs are insufficient, counsel must be provided.
We can no longer accept the routine processing of cases with
unfair results for unrepresented litigants. Absent a right to
appointed counsel in civil cases, the categorical limitation on the
more active role of the judge urged by Judicial Techniques, the
Best Practices, and the Massachusetts Guidelines must be
rejected.
2.

The Active Role is Ethically Permissible

Critics will continue to argue that providing further judicial
assistance is going too far. Indeed, those same critics would likely
resist the more modest steps articulated in Judicial Techniques,
Reaching Out or Overreaching, and the Massachusetts Guidelines.
These concerns mirror language in some cases warning that the
judge may not play the role of advocate or attorney for the
unrepresented litigant, practice law on their behalf, or give legal
advice.' l 2 Other objections to the more active role expressed by
judges include the opinion that assisting unrepresented litigants
amounts to giving them a "free lunch," that some unrepresented
litigants will try to use their unrepresented status to a tactical
advantage, and that steps to assist unrepresented litigants will
increase the likelihood that they choose to by-pass counsel even
when they have the means to retain counsel. 133 Even where
judges are permitted to be more active, critics, including many
judges, would argue it is impractical to expect them to do so
given the crushing volume of cases before them and the amount
of time that would be required for each case. The dockets would
grind to a halt.
The practical arguments relating to the time involved do not
stem from concerns of judicial ethics regarding the proper role
of the judges. They may well implicate other aspects of the judicial canons, such as disposing of all judicial matters promptly;
132.
133.

See Engler, supra note 1, at 2013.
Id. at 2015; GOLDSCMIDT ET AL., supra note 1, at 52.
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even there, however, the duty carries with it the obligation to dispose of matters fairly, a requirement that necessarily tempers the
pressure for speed. Nor are the solutions to the docket issue to
be found solely in our understanding of judicial ethics; changes
in the entire court system, not just the behavior of judges, hold
the keys to the solution.
The objections not based on practical issues stem from
notions of the "proper" role ofjudges. While framed in terms of
judicial ethics, the concerns are not grounded in specific
prohibitions that appear in the canons of judicial ethics. Rather,
they arise from interpretations of the general notions articulated
in the canons and case law regarding impartiality, neutrality, and
partisanship. As explained above, however, it is not the formal
ethics rules governing judges that compel our adherence to
those notions. The existing rules permit the judicial behavior
urged in this article. It is our attitudes, and the related interpretations of general principles and ethical guidelines, that must be
changed.
Education, training, guidelines, and protocols are important
tools in accelerating the transition in our attitudes. Individual
judges prepared to exercise their discretion in a manner that
seeks to protect vulnerable unrepresented litigants will find invaluable tools in the documents discussed in this article. Sharing
techniques that work, and incorporating the techniques as part
of judicial education and training, broaden the menu of available techniques and embolden judges who might otherwise feel
isolated and fearful to use those techniques. As our understanding changes as to the skills and temperament that are imperative
for judges regularly handling cases with unrepresented litigants,
the selection of judges will change as well.13" Finally, the adoption of protocols is crucial, but with the obvious caveat that the
devil is in the details. The adoption of protocols restricting more
active judges, rather than providing guidance to judges in their
efforts to provide needed help, would be worse than the absence
135
of protocols in the first place.
134. See ZORZA, supra note 3, at 109-13 (regarding the selection and training generally of "self-help" judges). New judges will be selected in an era in
which the need for judicial assistance to unrepresented litigants is increasingly
accepted as part of the role of the judge in particular contexts. As judges
selected against this backdrop replace judges appointed and trained in an earlier era, the pace of the change should accelerate..
135. Protocols and guidelines will reflect at least to some extent the prevailing attitudes in a particularjurisdiction. Any such protocols will be the result
of an intensely political process, going further than some would like, and not as
far as others have urged. Yet, they also reflect shifts over time. The recently
adopted guidelines in Massachusetts likely would not have garnered the neces-
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CONCLUSION

The past decade has seen a dramatic trend toward supporting the more active role ofjudges in trying to insure that litigants
appearing without counsel in civil cases obtain access to justice
despite the absence of counsel. Yet, at each turn, innovations and
initiatives to justify and effectuate the more active role face traditional objections that equate impartiality to passivity, regardless
of the context of the inquiry. The governing principles, critique
of the passive role, and intractable, high volume courts illustrate
the dangers of accepting the limits on the judicial role urged by
some commentators. Until and unless a Civil Gideon is implemented in a manner that provides counsel for vulnerable litigants in court, judges must be permitted to provide litigants with
the help they need. The buck stops with the judges. Where no
one else in the court system can provide the necessary assistance,
judges must be permitted to perform their duties in a manner
that achieves justice. Nothing in the rules of judicial ethics prohibits this course of action, and it is only our attitudes, reflected
in our interpretations of ethical rules, guidelines, and protocols,
that require changing. The dramatic shift in our attitudes over
the past decade provides hope that the day we liberate ourjudges
to provide justice is not too far away.

sary support a decade ago; guidelines drafted a decade from now will reflect any
intervening shift in attitudes.

